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Abstract 
There has been an increasing engagement between China and Africa in recent years as reflected 
by the level of aid, trade and investment flows. Building on the data available on China’s 
development assistance flows into Africa together with China’s FDI stocks as a ‘strategic interest 
variable’ gives an insight into the considerations given to the allocation of development 
financing. The findings based on project financing across a sample of twenty countries used as a 
proxy of China’s bilateral engagement turnover indicate a significant relationship with FDI. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Development assistance from China to Africa is nothing new, but the nature, volume and the 
architecture of it are observed to have changed over time. The new Chinese model of 
development aid is unique in that it is palpably woven into its strategic economic interests in 
Africa in what Davies et al (2008) call a ‘coalition of engagements’; aid is seen to be one aspect 
of the state’s collaborative business approach in the region. There have been some studies in 
recent years that seem to consider China’s development assistance as an economic diplomacy 
tool used to advance its commercial interest in securing resources and investments needs. Studies 
such as that of (Nour, 2010, Lengauer, 2011) cite the approach by China of underpinning its 
assistance to resources in deals such as oil-backed concessional loans in Sudan and Angola as 
being opportunistic at most. This view is echoed by of Brautigam (2008), Robertson and Corkin 
(2011) who notes that China’s large infrastructure loans are normally extended to countries rich 
in resources especially oil and also used as a gateway for its investments in recipient countries. 
However, in all these studies such views are largely based on informed opinions instead of hard 
empirical findings. The aim of this paper is to weigh in on this debate by systematically testing 
the allocation of Chinese loans in the region using FDI as a ‘strategic interest’ variable and find 
out if its assistance is donor interest driven. This research may be of great importance in 
providing an insight into the nature, distribution of Chinese loans and implications this has or will 
possibly have on Africa’s economic development as regard infrastructure development and debt 
sustainability. 
 
China’s development assistance in this paper is defined by the turn over of its bilateral loans (i.e. 
project financing). Aid from China to Africa is mostly given through projects not as budgetary 
support (Brautigam, 2008).Traditionally Chinese aid is extended to African countries it has 
diplomatic links with. China enjoys diplomatic ties with many of Africa’s forty eighty countries 
with the exception of Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Swaziland and Sao Tome and Principe which 
recognise Taiwan, (Lengauer,2011) 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section will provide a background on 
China’s economic engagement in Africa. Third section looks at China’s development assistance. 
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The fourth will be an empirical analysis. Lastly the fifth section will look at economic 
implications for development in Africa. 
 
2. Background  
 
2.1 Literature Review on China –Africa Economic Engagement 
 
There is an enormous body of literature on China’s economic engagement with Africa based on 
aid, FDI and trade as well as on aid motivations 
 
 Studies by (Lengauer 2011, Hubbard 2007, Brautigam 2008, Wang and Bio-Tchane, 2008) have 
made attempts at following aid flows to Africa by gathering information based on press releases 
and the recent less detailed white paper published by The State Council on aid in 2011 since there 
is no time series data provided by the Chinese authorities. Wang and Bio-Tchane (2008) 
estimated that the annual Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) flows to Africa increased 
from $310m in the period of 1989-1992 to $1.5 billion in 2004-2005.Brautigam (2008),estimates 
specifically looking at concessional loans commitments identified flows of around $10 billion by 
2009 from 1995 when China started giving out  such loans.  Based on the white paper on aid 
released in 2011, concessional loans are mainly directed to economic infrastructure development 
(61%), industry (16.1%), and energy and resources development (8.9%) with agriculture getting 
4%.Out of all concessional loans given by China, Africa was the destination of 45% of that 
amount in 2009, (Lengauer, 2011).  The calculation and tracking of aid flows is complicated by 
the lack of time series data and the combining of aid together with commercial loans: so precise 
figures are never easy to get. 
 
Due to the opaqueness of Chinese development assistance flows there is an increasing body of 
researchers who are critical of China’s aid to Africa who see the lack of detail as an attempt by 
the Chinese authorities to mask their motives. For instance Nour (2010) and Lengauer (2011) see 
China’s aid as largely driven by economic considerations to secure resources as well as open up 
new markets for its investments and goods. Nour (2010) cites the tying of Chinese aid to 
Sudanese oil exports and investments as a clear indication of aid creating a channel for the 
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pursuit of commercial interest. Although he acknowledges the importance of aid on infrastructure 
development he sees it as a long term threat as regard debt sustainability in countries like Sudan 
that were (are) not beneficiaries of debt relief programme and have no access to other alternative 
sources of finance. Others like Davies (2010) see the giving of aid by China as an attempt to 
water down its ‘brazen corporatist approach’ in its engagement with Africa. The thinking is 
premised on the concessional financing model used to finance infrastructure projects in recipient 
countries which ties aid to other requirements seen as beneficial to Chinese exports and firms. 
The concessional loans terms and conditions on procurement and use of Chinese contractors are 
both export promoting and as well as capital funding tool for China’s firms.   The model provides 
Chinese state owned firms (SOE’s) with easy capital to enter African markets as the front movers 
giving them an option to latter establish themselves once they finish their projects in  host 
countries. It has been observed in the infield research studies done in  Ghana for example that a 
good number of SOE’s entered into the market through the implementation of  China Eximbank 
led concessional loans projects and later on went to bid on local projects or establish consortiums 
to venture into other business interests available locally, (Davies et al, 2008).There are those who 
perceive China’s disregard for institutional quality in giving its aid as an affront to the efforts of 
traditional donors who are focused on aid that enhances institutional capacity. This is the 
perception shared by Weston et al (2011) who feel that China’s commercial interest override 
other considerations in its aid allocation.  
 
There is however, recognition of the role on infrastructure development that Chinese aid is 
playing in the region as it fills a saving-investment gap. Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa 
suffers from infrastructure deficit and lags behind other developing countries affecting regional 
trade and economic growth, (Foster et al, 2009).  Poor infrastructure is a major constraining 
factor on trade, Africa’s share of 3% of the total world trade arises from high transport costs 
which make it twice as expensive as OECD countries to transport goods across borders, (Davies 
(2010). Addressing the short fall will have wide implications on economic development. 
 
By and large, Alesina and Dollar (2005) in their study of aid allocation in general found out that 
aid flows are usually dictated by donor country strategic needs as well as the recipient country’s 
economic needs and policy performance. Aid motivations can in a nutshell be framed within the 
 6
context of donor interests and recipient needs guided by Jolly and Gadbois (1989) four aid 
mandates: 
• Humanitarian needs 
• Economic and Development  Growth 
• Promotion of trade and commercial interests 
• Protection  of geopolitical and foreign policy interests 
 
2.2 Theoretical Analysis  
 
Donor Interest Model: (McKinlay and Little, 1977, 1978, 1979; Maizels and Nissanke 1984) 
 
The donor interest model inbuilt assumption is that bilateral aid is used to advance donor interests 
as postulated first by McKinlay and Little. Based on their reasoning the amount of aid given to a 
developing country is in proportion to the level of donor interest in that particular country. These 
interests span from economic, security, political, promotion of democracy, development and 
stability. Maizels and Nissanke (1984) find this model to be relevant in the context of bilateral 
aid. Under this model donor country is seen to  have a number of reasons to advance 
development assistance. Maizels and Nissanke (1984) building on the work of McKinlay and 
Little categorize these into three main categorize: 
• Political and security interests  
• The investment interest-  a donor country  will be interested in ensuring economic 
development, by addressing the constraining factors  as such  for the purpose of 
securing own investments and strategic goals in a recipient country. Such aid is 
perceived to be a subsidy of its investments in the host country. The main purpose 
is to secure continual profitability of own firms in the country and minimise 
operational risks.  
• Trading interest – a donor country will be willing to finance and promote 
economic development in those countries that it has trading interest with to secure 
resources. 
They contend that even if aid is donor oriented it may still result in positive economic 
development through incidental effect in the receiving country. 
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Strategic interests of a donor country in a recipient country can be captured by the actual amount 
given to each country or as percentage share of total aid given to a group of countries based on 
the McKinlay and Little absolute commitment concept. Alternatively as argued by Maizels and 
Nissanke (1984) it is better to measure strategic interests using relative aid commitments to 
recipients as opposed to absolute commitments which do not take into recognition the influence 
of country’s size in terms of population has on aid allocation decisions which can lead to 
difficulties in the interpretation of regression results. Population on the recipient side can be an 
indicator of need, since countries with large populations can be said to be in need of more 
assistance than less populous countries at the same level of development. Additionally, 
population size is perceived to be a sound donor strategic variable since it denotes economic 
potential, political and military strength hence regional influence.  
 
2.3   Historical Perspective: Sino-Africa Economic Cooperation 
 
Egypt became the first African country to establish formal diplomatic ties with China after its 
own independence in 1956. As more and more African countries became independent, by 1978 
China had diplomatic connections with almost forty countries, (FOCAC, 2010). China’s 
engagement in Africa during the colonial era was much ideologically centred focusing mainly on 
assisting most African nationalists materially and training to fight against colonialism and 
capitalism. After most African countries became independent, trade and economic relations with 
China started to deepen. Trade was growing and Chinese contractors were taking on engineering 
projects on the continent, (FOCAC, 2010).Chinese engagement with Africa pre 2000 was more 
on a bilateral basis. In 2000, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was created in 
Beijing, with the main objective of building a strategic partnership based on equality, trust, 
economic cooperation and to exchange ideas. FOCAC is a triennial forum, starting with 2000. 
Under this multilateral framework the China’s government has introduced a host of measures to 
engage and facilitate economic cooperation with African countries. Some of the measures that 
have been initiated and implemented revolve around the issues of debt relief, zero tariffs for the 
least developed countries (LDC’s) in the region, development assistance, concessional loans, 
science and technology training and public and medical health, (FOCAC,2010). 
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2.4 China-Africa Trade Recent Trend 
 
Trade between China and Africa has increased manifolds over the years. Trade turnover was 
around $11 billion in 2000 and is projected to reach $400billion by 2015, (Robertson and Corkin, 
2011).Currently Africa is one of the regions that has a trade surplus with China. China’s trade 
volume with Africa reached $158.83 billion in 2011, with a deficit of $28.28 billion (Appendix, 
Table 2). In relative terms Africa’s share of trade turnover is only 4% of the $3.6 trillion Chinese 
trade volume with the rest of the world, (Appendix, Table 2).About 80% of trade turnover with 
Africa is with ten countries, eight of which have trade surpluses with China: see Fig.1: China’s 
exports from Africa are mainly oil and base metals such as aluminium, iron ore, copper, etc. 
Since China is the leading global consumer of most of these commodities and its demand is huge 
(Kamwanga and Koy, 2009).  Crude oil accounts for 80% of China’s imports from Africa i.e. 
30% of total oil imports, (Foster et al 2009). China exports are mainly mechanical, electronic 
products, textiles, footwear etc, (Asche and Schuller, 2008) 
 
Fig.1 Trade  between China and  its largest  trading partners (2011):  
Partner 
Imports  from 
China US$ M 
Exports  to 
China US$ M 
Total  
US$ M 
  %'Share hare 
of Trade  
Trade Deficit/Surplus 
South Africa     13,362      32,095      45,457  29%     24,812  
Angola      2,784      24,922      27,706  17%     22,138  
Sudan      1,995       9,542      11,536  7%      9,052  
Nigeria      9,206       1,584      10,789  7%         757  
Egypt      7,283       1,518       8,802  6%     (2,954) 
Algeria      4,472       1,961       6,433  4%     (2,511) 
Congo         489       4,672       5,162  3%      3,846  
Congo DR         827       3,162       3,989  3%         119  
Morocco      3,043          476       3,518  2%         476  
Ghana      3,110          363       3,473  2%         363  
 
Source: Calculations based on Comtrade trade data (2011) 
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South Africa is China’s largest trading partner by far in Africa with a share of 29% of the total 
trade turnover in the region and trade surplus of $18 billion. Much of South Africa’s exports 
consist of a variety of minerals ores such as coal, chrome ores, gold, iron, platinum, cars etc, 
(Burke et al 2008)  South Africa’s share of global production is significant for many minerals 
(Appendix, Table 4). South Africa happens to be also the largest market for Chinese exports. 
 
Trade with Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and Congo is mainly in crude oil. These 
countries are the biggest oil producers in Africa and account for 12% of global production as of 
2010, (Appendix, Table 4). Angola was the second largest exporter of oil to China after Saudi 
Arabia’s exports worth $39.5 billion in 2011 (based on Comtrade calculations). Angola now 
accounts for 18% of China’s total oil imports since 2006, (Executive Research Associates, 2009). 
Oil exports from Angola and Sudan were secured at the back of oil for infrastructure long term 
loans; where concessional, non concessional loans or a combination of both are given out with 
guaranteed oil exports being used as collateral by the host governments. Now a common practice 
with other resources as well (Davies et al, 2008).  
 
2.5 China Investments in Africa 
 
China’s ODI in Africa is primarily resource seeking and has been increasing with the increasing 
demand of raw materials needs. Looking at Fig.2 Chinese FDI is heavily concentrated in the oil 
sector (26%), followed by copper and iron. Chinese investments are fairly diversified in 
economies like South Africa, Egypt and Mauritius that are also diversified. Most of the 
investments are undertaken by large SOE’s. Chinese top most destinations for their investments 
are not significantly different from those favoured by other foreign investors if one looks at the 
top ten countries (Appendix, Table 1 and 3). 
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Fig.2 China Outward Investments Deals of $100m or more compiled by The Heritage Foundation 
2006-11 
Investor 
 Value 
($US 
millions)  Subsector Country 
Sinopec       730.00 Oil Angola 
Sinomach       500.00 Autos Cameroon 
Sinopec       540.00 Oil Cameroon 
CNPC       200.00 Oil Chad 
China Railway Engineering    1,190.00 Copper DRC 
MCC and Sinohydro    1,700.00 Copper DRC 
Minmetals    1,280.00 Copper DRC 
Export-Import Bank    3,000.00 Metals DRC 
CITIC and Chinalco       940.00 Aluminum Egypt 
Tianjin Development       200.00 Property Egypt 
Jushi Group       230.00 Other Egypt 
Bosai Minerals    1,200.00 Aluminum Ghana 
Sinopec       850.00 Gas Ghana 
Chinalco    1,350.00 Iron Guinea 
Wuhan Iron and Steel and China Development Bank       110.00 Iron Liberia 
CNPC        150.00 Oil Madagascar 
Taiyuan Iron consortium       750.00 Property Mauritius 
CNPC    4,990.00 Oil Niger 
China National Nuclear       190.00 Metals Niger 
China Railway Construction and China-Africa Development Fund    2,970.00 Construction Nigeria 
CNOOC     2,270.00 Energy Nigeria 
China Railway Materials       260.00 Iron Sierra Leone
Shandong Iron    1,490.00 Iron Sierra Leone
First Auto Works and CADF       100.00 Autos South Africa 
ICBC    5,600.00 Banking South Africa 
Jinchuan    1,360.00 Copper South Africa 
CIC        250.00 Investment South Africa 
SinoSteel       230.00 Steel South Africa 
Jinchuan Group and China Development Bank       230.00 Metals South Africa 
CITIC, China Development Bank, Long March Capital       470.00 Metals South Africa 
Sinochem       500.00 Agriculture Sudan 
CNOOC    1,450.00 Oil Uganda 
China Nonferrous       310.00 Copper Zambia 
China Nonferrous        300.00 Copper Zambia 
SinoSteel       100.00 Steel Zimbabwe 
Sinosteel       300.00 Metals Zimbabwe 
  
38,290.00  
     
*Heritage Chinese Investment Tracker only records $100m+ deals  
Source: The Heritage Foundation 
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In 1990 China’s FDI stock in Africa was $49 million and has grown ever since (Ancharaz and 
Nowbutsing, 2010).China’s FDI stock in Africa as of 2010 was $13 billion (Appendix, Table 1). 
Overally Chinese stock at 2.4% is still relatively small compared to Africa’s total FDI stock of 
$553 billion, (Appendix, Table 3). About 55.7% of China’s outward investments are concentrated 
in four countries and 91.1% are located in only 20 countries.  South Africa is the largest FDI host 
of China’s ODI on the continent and is the top destination when it comes to overall FDI stocks in 
Africa from elsewhere (Appendix, Table 3). South Africa is an open upper middle income 
country, the biggest economy in the region and is relatively advanced with a diversified economy 
unlike most other countries in the region.Even though South Africa is the largest Chinese ODI 
host, China’s share of FDI stock in South Africa is only 3.1% as of 2010 (Appendix, Table 3). 
Nigeria is the second destination. Nigeria’s attraction appears to be that it is an upper middle 
income country, the most populous (158 million people) and the biggest oil producer on the 
continent, (Appendix, Table 4 ) 
 
3. China’s Development Finance 
 
3.1 The Nature of China’s Development Assistance 
 
As noted by Davies et al (2008), the Chinese government has a broad definition of development 
assistance (aid) which is not in line with what is generally acceptable under OECD-Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) standards. China’s development aid in Africa is a combination of 
Overseas Development Aid (ODA) and other official flows (OOF), (Brautigam, 2008). OECD 
definition of aid encompasses grants or loans that are given to developing countries on bilateral 
terms, concessionary in nature with main objectives of promoting economic development and 
welfare, (Davies et al,2008). The ODA component is made up of concessional loans, zero interest 
loans and grants. They are deemed to be aid under the OECD (DAC) rules if they have a grant 
element of 25% of the total loan, (Brautigam, 2011) Furthermore, under DAC standards mixed 
loans i.e. ODA (soft loans) and OOF(commercial loans) are to be reported separately and only 
acceptable for projects that can not get commercial financing, (Ahmad 2008:Brautigam 
2008).Another requirement under DAC standards  is that aid should be untied with the exception 
of  food and technical aid, (Brautigam, 2008). The biggest challenge with Chinese development 
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assistance is that it is a conflation of both concessional and non-concessional financing. The large 
loans are more often than not a package of ODA and other official flows (OOF). For example the 
financing of Bui Dam hydro electric project in Ghana was made up of $292m in commercial 
export credits at a commercial interest rate and $270m as a concessional loan, (Brautigam, 2008). 
This is often thought to be the norm  in financing such big projects .Although it is very difficult 
to isolate what is concessional or not which can make a difference under OECD –DAC rules as to 
the true meaning of developmental assistance. Since such terms are not made public at best the 
loans given out regardless of the mix they are official flows given to another government, 
therefore they in essence capture China’s strategic interest. In one way it could be argued that 
they make their interests apparent by combining long-term commercial loans with aid as way of 
ensuring continual engagement and leverage their soft power with host nations over a long time. 
 
Types of China’s ODA 
 
Chinese aid can be identified in three forms based on the 2011 white paper on aid, (Lengauer, 
2011): 
• Grants-given out to finance the building of hospitals, schools, small and medium projects 
• Interest –free loans: finance public facilities, other projects that can improve people 
standards of living  and they have a tenure of 20 years 
• Concessional loans – available to finance large and medium sized infrastructure projects 
and other projects that promote economic development and social benefits. They have a 
repayment period of 15 to 20 years with interest rate of between 2% -3% and include a 
grace period of 5-7 years. 
 
3.2 Organisation Structure of China’s Development Finance 
 
China’s aid is directed by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) with involvement of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at ministerial level, beneath them are two government agencies 
supporting the disbursement, valuation and implementation of projects aid loans. The two 
government agencies involved are the Department of Aid and the Bureau of International 
Economic Cooperation. The former is responsible for the budget allocation and the disbursement, 
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while the latter is involved with the implementation and monitoring of project. A large chunk of 
China’s aid is given out through projects not as balance of payment, (Brautigam.2008). 
MOFCOM role in development finance architecture is to give grants and zero interest loans and 
works in coordination with China Eximbank on concessional loans, (Brautigam.2008).  
 
Policy Banks  
 
When it comes to the allocation of loans China Eximbank and China Development Bank are the 
main providers. Of the two the China Eximbank is the only bank that can give bilateral 
concessional loans, CDB on the other hand operates on a commercial basis. Concessional loans 
are used for projects aid normally combined with commercial loans for big projects .According to 
Brautigam (2008), concessional loans are now the largest window of China’s aid.  China 
Eximbank is now one of the largest lenders on the global stage, and much so in Africa. In the last 
decade the bank gave out $67 billion, $12 bilion more than the World Bank, (Cohen, 2011). 
China’s value of loans at $58 billion between the periods 2005 - 2012 is almost four times the 
foreign direct investment in the region, (Fig.4).China Eximbank loans make up the greater 
portion of the loans given in projects to Africa. Loans from China Eximbank accounted for 92% 
of China’s projects finance commitments in Africa between the periods of 2001-7. (Foster et al, 
2009). CDB’ s portfolio  on the continent has been growing rapidly as well, by end of 2010  it 
had  committed itself to 35 projects  across 30 countries, (Brautigam,2011). It is important to note 
that CDB loans are offered at commercial rates as opposed to concessional. With projects being 
undertaken it is difficult to isolate amounts given as commercial loans and those given at 
concessional terms since neither of the two banks publish any detailed information as regard their 
allocations and the terms of their loans.  
 
3.3 China’s Donor Interests 
 
The nature of aid from China is deemed to be different from what is regarded as aid under the 
OECD (DAC) rules; this has resulted in heavy criticism that China is using its aid to exploit 
resources of other developing countries. So it important to understand the nature of aid based on 
China’s values as well as the fact that it is still a developing country with limited resources. 
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China’s aid is modelled on the principles of lisuonengi and lianlierxing i.e. overseas aid should 
be within China’s capacity and means.  China’s aid since 1964 has been guided by eight 
principles, (Lengauer, 2011): 
1. Equality and mutual benefit 
2. Respect of sovereignty –no interference  
3. Low interest loans or zero interest  
4. main purpose to build self reliance for the recipient country 
5. support of project that results in capital accumulation 
6.  project have to done using equipment from china 
 
Broadly speaking Chinese motivations in their aid allocation decisions are in no way different 
from considerations that other donor countries have when they decide the recipients of their aid 
premised on the donor interest model. Bilateral aid by and large by nature is to be expected that 
within its construct it seeks to foster and nature national interest of the donor country in the 
recipient country. It can not be expected to be altruistic. From the findings of 2008 NYU Wagner 
School Study, in trying to understand Chinese aid – they identified economic and commercial 
interest to be dominant considerations,(Lengauer, 2011) .Chinese economic motives are largely 
driven by the need to secure natural resources, from crude oil to minerals that are essential for 
economic expansion.  
 
Chinese  government  dominance in the economy and the proximity  of the state owned 
enterprises  to its strategic policies  be they  on foreign  policy matters  or industrial policy  
enables  them to have  development assistance  run in tandem  with  their own trade and  
investment interests.  Considering the need for resources   for its economic growth, the ‘Go 
Global’ strategy    makes it possible for the state to use its aid to pursue its donor interests. 
China’s state centred approach to development which incorporates all state structures and 
relevant institutions situates the government differently from its peers from elsewhere when it 
comes to maximizing its strategic goals through use of development assistance. From the 
coordination standpoint of it, it is easy for the Chinese government to be able institutionally 
direct aid and  investments to countries that are of strategic importance resources wise and 
politically since it is the main or sole shareholder in most of those firms making inroads abroad. 
 15
 Chinese outward direct investments are born out of a government’s foreign investment strategy 
‘Going Global’ unveiled in the Five Year Plan (2001-2005) that encourages domestic firms to 
investment abroad. Part of the strategy is to engage in economic cooperation with regional blocks 
and FOCAC is one such forum, (Brautigam, 2008). The political embeddings in the structures of 
SOE’s has a bearing in the direction of their investments and access to finance. This makes it 
easier for the state to align its investments with national strategic considerations abroad.  SOE’s 
overseas drive has greatly been based on the government’s economic cooperation with other 
countries, this is especially so in Africa where Chinese development assistance seems to open 
ways for its firms to enter markets initially as contractors bearing no financial risk at all. Chinese 
ODI is characteristically different from other countries as it is largely driven by state owned 
enterprise (SOE’s). Almost 84% FDI stocks and flows are state owned, (Hurst, 2011).In the in-
market research conducted in Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia by Davies et al, (2008) it was found 
out that Chinese MNC’s tends to use aid as a lever to gain investment opportunities and markets.    
 
 
Leveraging Aid: The intersection between development assistance and investments interests 
 
China unlike OECD countries still use tied aid; all China Eximbank project loans require that 
50% of procurement are from China, the project has to be done by a Chinese contractor(s) with 
Chinese labour, Brautigam (2008). This to a great extent gives Chinese contractors a cautious 
entry point into a foreign market shielded from credit and operation risk since China Eximbank 
will be the one paying and in turn get its money from the host country. It has been observed that a 
number of SOE’s penetrate markets as has been the case in Ghana via China Eximbank 
concessional loans projects, (Davies et al 2008). 
 
Angola Model 
 
China widely uses its aid in the form of grants, loans alongside its commercial investments to 
gain access to resources and build political relationships, (Davies et al, 2008). China Eximbank is 
now increasingly using the resource for infrastructure deals known as the ‘Angola Model’ where 
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repayment of concessional loans or packaged loans (i.e. concessional and commercial) for 
infrastructure development are repaid using natural resources (e.g. oil), (Foster et al, 2009). 
Angola is often cited as one great example of how interlinked Chinese commercial and political 
interests are. China Eximbank loans gave Chinese oil giant Sinopec access to Angola’s oil 
through the oil for infrastructure loan deal. (Executive Research Associates,2009).Deals 
structured in this manner achieve three things; (1) political connections, (2) secure essential  
resources and (3) entry of their on MNC’s since most countries that accept such deals lack the 
capital to exploit their own resources. Such deals are increasingly becoming the norm for Chinese 
investments in Africa according to (Kaplisky and Morris, 2008: Ancharaz and Nowbutsing, 
2010). 
 
China’s aid to Sudan as well as that of Angola is seen to be motivated by political and economic 
considerations. The aid for infrastructure development is combined with commercial loans whose 
interest is tied to petroleum exports guarantee from Sudan conditioned upon Chinese companies 
doing the work with their own equipment using Chinese labour, Nour (2010).  
 
Resource-backed deals have become common place used mainly to secure essential resources not 
just oil in exchange for concessional loans (EU, 2011):e.g. 
• Guinea bauxite for the construction  of a dam 
• Zimbabwe chromium for  construction  of thermal power 
• Gabon Iron  
• Ghana cocoa for the construction of hydro electric power 
• Congo (DRC) copper mining concessions for  $6 billion infrastructure development 
• Nigeria oil –preferential access  
 
Their preference of such deals can be said to be driven by two reasons. One to ensure guaranteed 
supplies of essential raw materials, secondly it could seen as credit risk management plan on the 
part of the Chinese.   
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4. Data Analysis and Methodology 
 
4.1 Empirical Test 
 
As highlighted earlier in the paper the intention is to find out if development assistance is used as 
a tool to advance China’s strategic interests in this instance FDI using data from The Heritage 
Foundation China-Global –Investment –Tracker 2012 on contracts loans (of $100m or more) 
made up of  20 Africa countries in the period between 2005-2012 and Economic Freedom Index, 
for institutional quality together with China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM),2010 
Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward FDI (Appendix, Table1 ) as well as World Bank 
Development Indicators for 2011 
 
As regard the loans given out, there were 20 countries that had received contract loans from 
China by end of 2012 (Fig 4) and 12 that had received loans by 2010 which is a very small 
sample that would have resulted in a loss of important observations and considering that projects 
loans are not annual flows the aggregation of them are considered not to be materially significant. 
The Heritage Foundations only keeps track of loans that are $100m or more, so it does not 
necessarily mean the countries listed are the only ones receiving development assistance. 
According to Brautigam (2011) aid from China is widely distributed to all countries in the region 
with diplomatic ties with Beijing, not included are countries that recognise Taiwan as a state. 
However, the size of the loans can be an indication of the depth and commitment of economic 
cooperation with recipient countries saving as a barometer to measure donor strategic interest. It 
is also important to note that not all loans are necessarily concessional as some are given at 
commercial rates, but since China Eximbank uses ‘package financing’ where they mix 
concessional with commercial loans it is difficult to isolate ODA from market loans because the 
terms of the loans are not made public, (Brautigam 2008, Hubbard 2007). What is known 
however, is that China made concessional loans commitment  at FOCAC summit  in 2006 of 
$2billion combined with $3billion of preferential export credits and  at the 2009 summit they  
pledged  $10billion in concessional/preferential credits to be committed over the course of three 
years by 2012, (Brautigam, 2011). Based on the formulation of concessional loans, it can be 
assumed that China has given away $15billion of aid between 2006-2012 which is less the 
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amount of loans calculated for the period 2005-2012 which is $58 billion, (Fig. 4) indicating that 
a greater component is made up of either commercial or zero interest loans. It is always 
challenging for researchers to get data on aid flows since Chinese government does not report its 
aid commitments, many researchers have to rely on estimates through reports made in the media, 
(Brautigam, 2011) 
  
The model used here is an OLS; the intention is to find out if there is a relationship in the 
direction of economic cooperation (development assistance), outward FDI and oil producing 
countries. If there exists a correlation between the loans, FDI and big oil producers, tentatively it 
will be seen to be an indication of development finance being used as a strategic tool to build up 
soft power to enable investments as well as to ensure resource access. 
 
Hypothesis to be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 1: China’s FDI stock will be high in countries that receive large loans: 
 
εβββββββ ++++++++= LogIFLogPRLogFCLogPOPLogGDPLogFDIoLogPCLoans  
Hypothesis 2: China’s loans and FDI tend flow more to oil producing countries: 
 
εβββββββ +++++++++= DummyLogIFLogPRLogFCLogPOPLogGDPLogFDIoLogPCLoans  
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Results 
 
Fig 3.Determinants of Contract loans (2005-2010):OLS Regression 
 
Dependent Variable: LOANS  Equation 1       Equation 2    
Variables  Std.  P‐Value     Variables  Std.  P‐Value 
C  103.5941      C  111.2220   
FDI      per capita  0.884706  ***    FDI  0.879483 *** 
GDP     per capita  0.022498  ***    GDP  0.032213 *** 
POP (Population)  0.987566      POP  1.213704   
FC (Freedom from Corruption)  8.134996      FC  9.120391   
PR(Property Rights)       7.287697  ***    PR  7.280783 *** 
IF (Investment Freedom)  3.621364  ****    IF  3.627396 **** 
Dummy  for Oil –producing Countries        OIL=1  111.4540   
R‐squared  0.718084      0.745087      
Adjusted R‐squared  0.587969      0.596387      
Number of Countries   20     20      
               
*<0.10**p<0.05,***p<0.01,  ****p<0.001               
 
Dependent Variable  
Contracts loans published by the Heritage Foundation which tracks Chinese investments and 
contracts abroad is chosen since the financing of these projects are based on bilateral 
arrangements rather than private contracting. It is an indirect estimate of development assistance 
since it combines both ODA and other government official flows (OOF). Contracts are not 
included as FDI since these projects will be handed to the respective host governments upon 
completion. This dependant variable shows data on turnover of bilateral engagement (divided by 
population) based on the relative commitment concept of donor interest model to get net aid per 
head since population size can be taken to denote recipient need as well as capture donor interest 
based on size, (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984).Developing countries with big populations are likely 
to need more aid than countries with small populations from donor perspective they represent 
market potential as well as political importance. There are some studies that employ absolute aid 
as the dependent variable, but the regression results are problematic to interpret, (Jolly and 
Gadbois, 1989).  
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Explanatory Variable 
ODI stock for 2010 was chosen instead of FDI flows; since they are cumulative they are likely to 
be a good indicator of the long term commitment overtime as opposed to flows which changes 
from year to year. FDI is chosen since it is considered to be an approximate measure of strategic 
interest  capture. 
 
Control Variables 
It is important to note that they are other factors that affect the flow of FDI into a host country 
other than aid, 
 
GDP (Constant 2000) The GDP of a recipient country reflects the size of the market, the state of 
development. GDP per capita is used as an indicator of need relative to other countries for 
development assistance 
 
Institutional Quality Indexes; Generally ODA and FDI tend to flow to countries with better and 
well functioning institutions that protect and encourage private enterprise to operate without 
hindrance. 
 
 Investment freedom-open market economies allow for the easy flow of capital, making it easier 
for investors to move their resources in activities they deem viable without constraints.  
Property Rights- It indicates the respect of private enterprising and the capacity of judicial system 
to enforce contracts without interference from national governments 
Freedom of corruption-introduces uncertainty and insecurity in business transactions 
undermining meaningful investments 
 
First regression test is for all countries using contract loans per capita as the dependent variable to 
take account of relative need since large countries will generally get more aid flows because of 
the size of their populations.FDI stock per capita is used as an independent variable controlling 
for GDP, and institutional quality indexes. Second test is done using a dummy for oil biggest 
producers (i.e. Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Egypt, Algeria and Libya based on the regions above 
average oil production levels of 2010 (Appendix, Table 4) to capture the general view that one of 
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China’s strategic interest is to secure oil supplies and also because oil constitute 80% of Africa’ s 
total exports to China, (Foster et al 2009). 
 
Results Discussion 
 
The regressions give some insight into the determinants of China’s development financing. The 
GDP per capita, FDI, property rights and investment freedom are significantly related to project 
loans. FDI stock per capita is significantly related to bilateral loans, a sign that Chinese lending is 
closely related to FDI in part perhaps due to tied aid.  The dummy for oil producing countries is 
not significantly related to loans allocation, an indication that loans are not concentrated only to 
oil producing countries as is widely perceived. The significance of GDP could be that China 
gives large loans to those countries that are perceived to have the capacity to repay with high per 
capita incomes. As a requirement for concessional loans lending by China Eximbank, the 
recipient country which is the guarantor of the loan must have good credit and capacity to make 
repayments, (Hubbard, 2007).The results are in line with observations made by some researchers 
such as Brautigam (2008) that large concessional loans are advanced to countries that have 
relatively high GDP per capita and have rich deposits of natural resources that can be used as 
collateral for such loans. According to Brautigam (2011), grants and zero interest loans are given 
fairly to a number of countries whereas concessional loans are given based on the country’s 
ability to repay either because it’s a middle income economy or the project being financed will 
generate income. Chinese lending is statistically significantly related to investment freedom and 
property rights. One of the condition for concessional lending is that the recipient country must 
have political stability and relatively favourable economic conditions for economic growth, 
(Hubbard, 2007). 
 
4.2 Descriptive Empirical Findings: 
 
The distribution of loans in based on Chinese financed contracts being under taken or completed 
in Africa between the periods of 2005 -2012.  
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Fig.4 Contract Loans 2005-2012 Distribution  
Country Contracts Value US$ ml 2005-2012 %Share Income Group 
Nigeria 13,590.00 23.33% Upper middle income 
Algeria 10,500.00 18.02% Upper middle income 
Chad 6,620.00 11.36%  Lower middle income 
Ethiopia 6,360.00 10.92%  Lower middle income 
Libya 4,240.00 7.28% High income 
Sierra Leone 2,980.00 5.12% Low income 
Cameroon 2,760.00 4.74% Upper middle income 
Egypt 2,210.00 3.79% Upper middle income 
Zambia 2,030.00 3.48%  Lower middle income 
Sudan 1,910.00 3.28% Upper middle income 
Ghana 1,830.00 3.14% Upper middle income 
DRC 660.00 1.13% Low income 
Guinea 530.00 0.91% Low income 
Congo 520.00 0.89% Upper middle income 
Djibouti 510.00 0.88% Low income 
Angola 350.00 0.60% Upper middle income 
Uganda 350.00 0.60%  Lower middle income 
Mauritius 110.00 0.19% High income 
Mauritania 100.00 0.17% Upper middle income 
Zimbabwe 100.00 0.17% Low income 
  58,260.00     
High Income: 7%, Upper Middle Income: 58%, Lower Middle Income: 26% and Low Income:8% 
Source: The Heritage Foundation 2012 
 
One major notable thing is that big loans seem to be given to mostly upper middle income 
countries taking 58% of all the loans when combined with high income and lower middle income 
groups together they constitute 92% of the loan portfolio in Africa. The reason as mentioned 
elsewhere is that terms and conditions of concessional loans require that the recipient country is 
stable and has the capacity to repay the loans. Together these countries are host to 51% of 
China’s total FDI stock in the region followed by South Africa with 31% which is a semi-
industrialised country, (Appendix, Table 1 ).Chinese loans allocation considerations can be said 
to be enhancing to their ODI because these countries will not only be able to repay loans but they 
also present ready markets for Chinese manufactured goods. The loans within the reference of 
investments interest in the donor interest model act as a subsidy to Chinese firms: first by 
enabling them to enter markets as contractors without assuming financial risk and secondly by 
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addressing the major operational constrain which is infrastructure. The railroads, roads and hydro 
electric power stations are not only beneficial to the host countries, they will also make it easier 
for Chinese firms to power their plants and transport the resources they need from the continent 
as well as export their goods in. Chinese loans into Africa for the period under review are almost 
four times as much as FDI flows. An indication perhaps of China’s effort to consolidate its 
economic diplomacy ahead of its investments. 
 
Nigeria can be seen as important strategically in the eyes of China because of the size of its 
potential domestic market of 158 m people, its huge oil reserves, and its strategic location in the 
Gulf of Guinea region. From a donor interest perspective Nigeria is important both economically 
and politically. It is the largest oil producer in Africa controlling about 24% and 3% global 
annual production as of 2010 respectively (Appendix, Table 4) 
 
Algeria has enjoyed good diplomatic relations with China since 1958, much favoured for being a 
co-sponsor of the motion in United Nations  in 1970s that restored China legitimate seat.It has 
been rewarded with big contracts in recent years, with CITI Group and China Railway 
Construction Corp being awarded the largest Chinese contract on the continent so far of $6.25 
billion, (Ying and Xin, 2008). Additionally it is the third biggest oil producer  on the continent. 
 
Ethiopia importance is more largely as a potential market because the size of its population of 
around 81m as well is the de facto status of Addis Ababa as the capital city of Africa because of 
the African Union Headquarters. The country has no notable resources. 
 
Chad perhaps offers a unique case that demonstrates Chinese market entry strategy; loans first, 
investments latter. Before 2006 there were no diplomatic ties between Chad and China because of 
the latter’s allegiance to Taiwan. Since Chad switched to China, it has been receiving enormous 
amount of loans because of its oil, it is currently an insignificant ODI destination (Appendix, 
Table 1).  Chinese companies have managed to secure some oil exploration and drilling rights, 
(Foster et al, 2009). 
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5. Economic Development Implications for Africa 
 
The amount of loans being pumped into Africa from China can be a double edged sword if they 
continue to be lack of transparency as regard the composition. Availability of the loans fills a 
financing gap between savings and capital spending in Africa, (Nour, 2010). On the other hand 
because China’s development assistance is packaged together with commercial interest loans the 
cost of most of the loans is unknown to many stakeholders creating a very difficult situation in 
the monitoring of debt levels and can possibly undermine the efforts by other lenders on debt 
relief. There is a general worry by other stakeholders that the loans could lead to unsustainable 
debt levels and dependence, leaving some countries locked indebt for a long time to come 
especially those countries that have not been beneficiaries of debt relief program and can not 
borrow from other international lenders like Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe, (Foster et al, 2009) 
There is no questionable doubt that infrastructure financing is going a long way in addressing 
infrastructure deficit on the continent 
 
Implication on Economic Development 
 
 The loans have a greater appeal to most African countries because of few conditions that are 
attached to them as is the case generally with the multilateral lenders. The loans are generally 
given to finance projects that are chosen by the host government and approved by China 
Eximbank. Exim loans have the appeal of ownership allowing the host government to direct the 
loans to areas they feel need to be addressed as opposed to the lender coming up with their own 
projects as is the case with World Bank funding and IMF. African governments are given ‘policy 
space’ to leverage  and direct loans to projects  that matters  to their constituencies (Oya,2008), 
The focus by Chinese lenders on infrastructure development  is considered a noble one  by a 
number of stakeholders . Africa suffers from perennial infrastructure deficit hampering 
development on regional trade, as well as foreign investment. The infrastructure development 
targets hydro electric power, railroads. According to Foster et al (2009), by end of 2007 China 
had committed to provide $3b towards the construction of 10 major hydro projects which will 
increase  the generating capacity by 30%. The impact in this area will be huge in the future 
enabling trade and more foreign investments. 
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 Threats to future African Development 
 
There is challenge that is posed by the loans and another one by Chinese investments. The mixing 
of loans and lack of detailed terms, especially as regard resource-backed ones creates a degree of 
opacity that makes it difficult to know exactly what the benefits are. Resource for infrastructure 
loans such the one that was negotiated by the government of Ghana where the loan for Bui dam 
hydro electric project is backed by 20 years supply of cocoa (Robertson and Corkin, 2011) are 
complex to evaluate in the long run creating a potential hazard for some countries which may end 
up being locked in bad deals as it eliminates market options.  The level of debt that some 
countries are incurring in light of the fact that some government regimes negotiating these loans 
can not be hold accountable by their constituencies there is a concern that some countries will 
end up wallowing in a sea of debt once their resources wane out. The findings by EU (2011), 
notes that some countries that benefited from debt relief have already contracted debt in excess of 
those values e.g. Guinea, and some more debt, Nigeria and Mauritania for instance, the debts are 
built at the back of loans coming from China.  
 
China’s cheap manufactured imports are crowding out local competing manufacturers driving 
them out of business in most African countries as they are destroying local industries. This more 
true with the textile industry.  The large number of Chinese workers who are contracted to 
projects as resulted in the increase in small scale Chinese traders selling cheap goods competing 
with African informal traders, (Brautigam, 2011). In many African countries this is a big 
challenge since the majority of the people are informal traders whose livelihoods solely depends 
on selling wares 
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6 Conclusions 
 
This paper considered the aspects of donor interests in the calculation of China’s development 
assistance allocations. Due to the limitation of data available, an attempt was made to try and 
analyse Chinese aid using an indirect method of contract loans which can be said to be partially 
reflective of China’s aid allocation considerations. It is difficult to isolate the loans because they 
are often offered in the form of a packaged finance with no terms being made public; so the  level 
of non concessional and concessional terms are not clearly know.   China has been noted to have 
a broad interpretation of aid than is the case under OECD-(DAC) rules making difficult to draw 
credible comparisons with OECD countries.  
 
The findings show that China’s financing tend to be directed to those countries that are in the 
middle income to high income bracket that have the capacity to repay loans and are also 
generally resource rich. Out of the sample only Ethiopia, Djibouti and Mauritius can be 
considered non resource rich countries. 
 
In a nutshell there appears to be a significant intersection between development assistance and 
investments an indication of the donor leveraging its resources to advance its on interest which 
have an incidental effect of meeting the recipients’ needs. It is perhaps worth evaluating China’s 
development finance in the context of South-South cooperation where another developing 
country is trying to assist other developing countries with its limited resources. Guided by its 
eight principles on aid; the first principle seeks equality and mutual benefit. So China’s 
Development can be seen by some to be of mutual benefit. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.China Outward FDI Stock by Country as of 2010  
Ministry of Finance (MOFCOM) 
China Outward FDI stock by country as 2010 in Millions (USD)                            
Country                                                                         ODI Stock ($USM)                   Share 
South Africa                     4,153.0  31.8% 
Nigeria                     1,210.9  9.3% 
Algeria                        973.3  7.4% 
Zambia                        943.7  7.2% 
Congo DR                       630.9  4.8% 
Sudan                        613.4  4.7% 
Niger                        379.4  2.9% 
Ethiopia                        368.1  2.8% 
Angola                        351.8  2.7% 
Egypt                        336.7  2.6% 
Tanzania                        307.5  2.4% 
Mauritius                        283.3  2.2% 
Madagascar                        229.9  1.8% 
 Kenya                        221.6  1.7% 
Ghana                        202.0  1.5% 
Botswana                        178.5  1.4% 
Guinea                        136.4  1.0% 
Republic of Congo - Brazzaville                       135.9  1.0% 
Zimbabwe                        134.5  1.0% 
Gabon                        125.3  1.0% 
Uganda                        113.7  0.9% 
Equatorial Guinea                          86.3  0.7% 
Liberia                          81.7  0.6% 
Chad                          80.0  0.6% 
Mozambique                          75.2  0.6% 
Cameroon                          59.6  0.5% 
 32
Togo                          58.1  0.4% 
Morocco                          55.9  0.4% 
Mali                          47.8  0.4% 
Namibia                          47.1  0.4% 
Central African Republic                          46.5  0.4% 
Mauritania                          45.9  0.4% 
Senegal                         45.0  0.3% 
Rwanda                          41.6  0.3% 
Sierra Leone                          41.5  0.3% 
Benin                          39.3  0.3% 
Cote D'voir                         33.0  0.3% 
Malawi -                         32.4  0.2% 
Libya                          32.2  0.2% 
Guinea-Bissau                          27.0  0.2% 
Seychelles                          19.4  0.1% 
Eritrea                          12.5  0.1% 
Djibouti                         12.5  0.1% 
 Lesotho                            8.9  0.1% 
Burundi                            6.5  0.0% 
Cape Verde                            4.6  0.0% 
Comoros                            4.0  0.0% 
Tunisia                            2.5  0.0% 
Gambia                            1.2  0.0% 
Sao Tomé and Príncipe                            0.0  0.0% 
                  13,077.84    
Source MOFCOM: Ministry of Commerce 2010  
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Table 2 Trade-Exports and Imports (2011) COMTRADE 
Partner 
Imports  from 
China $Usm 
Exports  to 
China $USm 
Total  
 Share of 
Trade  
Trade 
Deficit/Surplus 
South Africa               13,362                32,095             45,457 29%               24,812  
Angola                 2,784                24,922             27,706 17%               22,138  
Sudan                 1,995                 9,542              11,536 7%                 9,052  
Nigeria                 9,206                 1,584              10,789 7%                    757  
Egypt                 7,283                 1,518               8,802  6%                (2,954) 
Algeria                 4,472                 1,961               6,433  4%                (2,511) 
Congo                    489                 4,672               5,162  3%                 3,846  
Congo DR                    827                 3,162               3,989  3%                    119  
Morocco                 3,043                    476               3,518  2%                   (245) 
Ghana                 3,110                    363               3,473  2%                   (254) 
Zambia                    617                 2,776               3,393  2%                 1,902  
Benin                 2,875                    176               3,051  2%                (2,698) 
Libya                    720                 2,064               2,784  2%                 1,797  
Kenya                 2,369                      60               2,428  2%                   (814) 
Tanzania                 1,654                    490               2,144  1%                   (210) 
Equatorial Guinea                    266                 1,673               1,939  1%                    799  
Cameroon                    874                    663               1,537  1%                    663  
Mauritania                      -                   1,517               1,517  1%                 1,107  
Tunisia                 1,113                    219               1,332  1%                   (461) 
Ethiopia                    885                    292               1,177  1%                   (408) 
Mozambique                    700                    257                  957  1%                   (359) 
Zimbabwe                    410                    464                  874  1%                     (39) 
Gabon                    270                    578                  848  1%                   (102) 
Senegal                    680                      69                  749  0%                   (435) 
Botswana                    616                    101                  717  0%                   (515) 
Côte d'Ivoire                    541                    162                  703  0%                   (468) 
Guinea                    630                      16                  646  0%                   (488) 
Madagascar                    503                    103                  607  0%                   (194) 
Djibouti                    509                        0                  509  0%                   (282) 
Namibia                    282                    224                  507  0%                    130  
Mauritius                    497                      10                  507  0%                   (281) 
Mali                    298                    150                  447  0%                     (75) 
Uganda                    359                      40                  400  0%                   (108) 
Chad                     95                    265                  360  0%                     (26) 
Gambia                    291                      54                  345  0%                   (171) 
Sierra Leone                    225                      28                  253  0%                     (39) 
Burkina Faso                     56                    182                  238  0%                    127  
Malawi                    112                      46                  158  0%                     (45) 
Eritrea                    148                        1                  149  0%                     (66) 
Rwanda                     67                      78                  145  0%                      28  
Niger                    142                        2                  144  0%                       2  
Somalia                     91                        6                    97  0%                     (29) 
Togo                       2                      77                    78  0%                      77  
Cape Verde                     50                      -                      50  0%                     (50) 
Liberia                      -                        41                    41  0%                      41  
Seychelles                     35                        0                    35  0%                       0  
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Swaziland                     31                        0                    31  0%                       0  
Central African Rep.                      -                        28                    28  0%                      13  
Guinea-Bissau                     15                        4                    19  0%                       4  
Burundi                      14                    14  0%                      14  
Lesotho                        7                      7  0%   
Western Sahara                       0                      0  0%   
            
                52,236                61,138           158,832                 28,288  
Source: Comtrade (2011) 
 
 
Table 3.  UNCTAD 2010 Inward Stock and MOFCOM STOCK 2010 
 Total Global Stock China Stock Share of Total 
 Africa  2010 MOFCOM  2010 FDI Stock 
 South Africa  132396 4152.98 3.14%
 Egypt  73095 336.72 0.25%
 Nigeria  60327 1210.85 0.91%
 Morocco  42023 55.85 0.04%
 Tunisia  31367 2.53 0.00%
 Angola  25028 351.77 0.27%
 Sudan  20743 613.36 0.46%
 Algeria  19498 973.26 0.74%
 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  19342 32.19 0.02%
 Congo  15983 135.88 0.10%
 Ghana  9098 202 0.15%
 Zambia  8515 943.73 0.71%
 United Republic of Tanzania  7966 307.51 0.23%
 Equatorial Guinea  7374 86.25 0.07%
 Côte d’ Ivoire  6641 32.99 0.02%
 Uganda  5853 113.68 0.09%
 Mozambique  5489 75.24 0.06%
 Namibia  5290 47.11 0.04%
 Liberia  4888 81.67 0.06%
 Cameroon  4828 59.61 0.05%
 Madagascar  4452 229.87 0.17%
 Chad  4168 80 0.06%
 Ethiopia  4102 368.06 0.28%
 Congo, Democratic Republic of  3994 630.92 0.48%
 Mauritius  2319 283.29 0.21%
 Niger  2310 379.36 0.29%
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 Kenya  2262 221.58 0.17%
 Mauritania  2155 45.88 0.03%
 Seychelles  2017 19.36 0.01%
 Guinea  1917 136.41 0.10%
 Zimbabwe  1754 134.54 0.10%
 Senegal  1615 45.03 0.03%
 Gabon  1438 125.34 0.09%
 Botswana  1299 8.88 0.01%
 Mali  1234 47.77 0.04%
 Cape Verde  1140 4.58 0.00%
 Lesotho  1129 8.88 0.01%
 Malawi  961 32.4 0.02%
 Togo  955 58.11 0.04%
 Burkina Faso  905 0 0.00%
 Swaziland  902 0 0.00%
 Djibouti  878 12.47 0.01%
 Benin   849 39.33 0.03%
 Gambia  675 1.19 0.00%
 Somalia   566 0 0.00%
 Sierra Leone  495 41.48 0.03%
 Eritrea   438 12.54 0.01%
 Rwanda  435 41.63 0.03%
 Central African Republic  369 46.54 0.04%
 Guinea-Bissau  190 27 0.02%
 São Tomé and Principe  163 0.031 0.00%
 Burundi  86 6.51 0.00%
 Comoros  58 0 0.00%
               553,974.00         
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Table 4: World Mineral Production (2010) 
World Mineral Production: 2006-2010       
British Geological Survey   2012     
      World Total tonnes (metric) 
Country  2010 Africa Share Global Production World Share 
Aluminium            41,500,000.00    
Cameroon                    76,000.00 4%  0.18% 
Egypt                  281,100.00 16%  0.68% 
Mozambique                  557,000.00 32%  1.34% 
Nigeria                    21,200.00 1%  0.05% 
South Africa                  807,000.00 46%  1.94% 
Subtotal                 1,742,300.00   4%   
       
Chromium ores and Concentrates          30,000,000.00    
Madagascar                  134,500.00 1%  0.45% 
South Africa              10,871,095.00 94%  36.24% 
Sudan                    56,823.00 0%  0.19% 
Zimbabwe                  510,424.00 4%  1.70% 
Subtotal               11,572,842.00   39%   
       
       
Coal      7,153,000,000.00    
South Africa            254,521,945.00 98.65%  3.56% 
DRC                  120,000.00 0.05%  0.00% 
Egypt                  300,000.00 0.12%  0.00% 
Malawi                    79,185.00 0.03%  0.00% 
Mozambique 25000 0.01%  0.00% 
Niger                  246,558.00 0.10%  0.00% 
Nigeria                    44,148.00 0.02%  0.00% 
Swaziland                  145,903.00 0.06%  0.00% 
Tanzania                    16,000.00 0.01%  0.00% 
Zambia                    14,000.00 0.01%  0.00% 
Zimbabwe                2,488,856.00 0.96%  0.03% 
Subtotal             258,001,595.00   4%   
       
Copper           16,200,000.00    
Botswana                    25,000.00 1.80%  0.15% 
DRC                  377,900.00 27.23%  2.33% 
Mauritania                    36,969.00 2.66%  0.23% 
Morocco                    15,000.00 1.08%  0.09% 
South Africa                  102,600.00 7.39%  0.63% 
Tanzania                      6,400.00 0.46%  0.04% 
Zambia                  819,159.00 59.03%  5.06% 
Zimbabwe                      4,675.00 0.34%  0.03% 
Subtotal                 1,387,703.00   9%   
       
Diamond         135,000,000.00    
Angola                8,362,139.00 10.83%  6% 
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Botswana              27,556,000.00 35.70%  20% 
Cameroon                    12,000.00 0.02%  0% 
Central African Republic                  301,558.00 0.39%  0% 
Congo                  381,242.00 0.49%  0% 
DRC              20,166,220.00 26.12%  15% 
Ghana                  308,679.00 0.40%  0% 
Guinea                  374,096.00 0.48%  0% 
Ivory Coast                  300,000.00 0.39%  0% 
Lesotho                  108,827.00 0.14%  0% 
Liberia                    25,357.00 0.03%  0% 
Namibia                1,475,610.00 1.91%  1% 
Sierra Leone                  437,552.00 0.57%  0% 
South Africa                8,868,389.00 11.49%  7% 
Tanzania                    82,028.00 0.11%  0% 
Togo                          96.00 0.00%  0% 
Zimbabwe                8,435,224.00 10.93%  6% 
Subtotal               77,195,017.00   57%   
       
Iron      2,611,000,000.00    
       
Algeria                1,474,279.00 2%  0.06% 
Egypt                1,800,000.00 2%  0.07% 
Mauritania              11,109,000.00 15%  0.43% 
Morocco                    44,665.00 0%  0.00% 
Nigeria                    50,000.00 0%  0.00% 
South Africa              58,709,330.00 80%  2.25% 
Tunisia                  162,300.00 0%  0.01% 
Uganda                      3,795.00 0%  0.00% 
Zimbabwe                          37.00 0%  0.00% 
Subtotal               73,353,406.00   3%   
       
Crude Petroleum      3,901,000,000.00    
       
Algeria              77,700,000.00 16.2%  2% 
Angola              90,700,000.00 18.9%  2% 
Cameroon                3,200,000.00 0.7%  0% 
Chad                6,400,000.00 1.3%  0% 
Congo              15,400,000.00 3.2%  0% 
DRC                1,050,000.00 0.2%  0% 
Egypt              35,000,000.00 7.3%  1% 
Equatorial  Guinea              13,600,000.00 2.8%  0% 
Gabon              12,200,000.00 2.5%  0% 
Ghana                  360,200.00 0.1%  0% 
Ivory Coast                2,196,000.00 0.5%  0% 
Libya              77,500,000.00 16.2%  2% 
Mauritania                  412,465.00 0.1%  0% 
Morocco                      7,400.00 0.0%  0% 
Nigeria            115,200,000.00 24.1%  3% 
Senegal                  316,000.00 0.1%  0% 
Sudan              23,900,000.00 5.0%  1% 
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Tunisia                3,731,400.00 0.8%  0% 
Subtotal             478,873,465.00   12%   
       
Platinum               482,000.00    
       
Botswana                      3,888.00 1.3%  1% 
Ethopia                            8.00 0.0%  0% 
South Africa                  287,304.00 93.2%  60% 
Zimbabwe                    17,221.00 5.6%  4% 
Subtotal                   308,421.00   64%   
       
    tonnes (metal content) 
       
Uranium                 63,900.00    
       
Malawi                         671.00 6%  1% 
Namibia                      4,965.00 48%  8% 
Niger                      4,198.00 40%  7% 
South Africa                         583.00 6%  1% 
Subtotal                     10,417.00   16%   
     
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/home.html    
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